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I. INTRODUCTION 
During much of its history, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) 
primarily finalized its work in the form of draft conventions or draft articles 
with an eye to their negotiation and adoption as treaties, although it did also 
release soft law1 documents such as principles and draft declarations. 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to the participants in the FIU Law 
Review 70th Anniversary Celebration Symposium, and particularly to Danae Azaria and Charles Jalloh 
for their assistance and insights, as well as to the FIU Law Review editors. 
1 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (2d ed. 2005) (“Soft law” is “a body of standards, 
commitments, joint statements, or declarations of policy or intention . . . .”). There is an extensive literature 
on the definition, scope, and legitimacy of soft law, as well as its implications for international law regimes 
and international relations. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 173 (2010) (defining soft law as “a continuum, or spectrum, running between 
fully binding treaties and fully political positions.”); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International 
Law, International Relations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 540, 551 
(Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (defining soft law as “instruments or rules that have some indicia of 
international law but lack explicit and agreed legal bindingness.”); Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68, 69 (David Armstrong ed., 2008) (defining soft law 
as “a type of social rather than legal norm. . . . [including] any written instrument, other than a treaty, 
containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior.”); see also Jan 
Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167 (1996) (critiquing soft law as “those 
instruments which are to be considered as giving rise to legal effects, but do not (or not yet, perhaps) 
amount to real law.”).  
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However, since the 1990s, the ILC has increasingly produced soft law; even 
when it has released draft articles, it has not always sought to have those draft 
articles immediately considered for adoption as a convention. Thus, over 
time, the balance of the ILC’s work product has transitioned from being 
predominantly oriented toward development of hard law2 to predominantly 
comprising soft law, although it has continued to include both.3 
Scholars assessing the work of the ILC between 2008 and 2015 
commented on this change in the ILC’s practice. According to their analysis, 
this shift represented an appropriate acquiescence in a general global trend 
away from a preference for hard law norms enshrined in treaties and toward 
soft law norms that are more susceptible of gradual development, 
interpretation, and evolution. They also characterized this new strategy as a 
reaction specifically to the failure of some conventions developed from the 
ILC’s draft articles to secure substantial numbers of ratifications, and to 
repeated United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) reluctance to 
negotiate treaties based on the ILC’s draft articles and recommendations. All 
in all, the scholarly consensus was that the transition toward soft law could 
revive the ILC’s relevance in the face of declining state interest in developing 
multilateral treaties as a mode of global law-making.4 
Since then, this soft law trend has continued. Between 2016 and 2018, 
the ILC finalized three soft law works: a Final Report of the Study Group on 
the Most-Favored Nation Clause, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent 
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of 
Treaties, and Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International 
 
2  See Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard and Soft Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 197, 198 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & 
Marka A. Pollack, eds., 2012). In contrast to soft law, hard law is understood to impose legally binding 
obligations; treaties are a quintessential example of hard law. Id. 
3 Jacob Katz Cogan, The Changing Form of the International Law Commission’s Work, in 
EVOLUTIONS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 275, 277–78 (Roberto Virzo & Ivan 
Ingravallo, eds., 2015) (noting only one instance of the ILC producing draft articles and recommending 
that the UNGA use them as the basis for treaty negotiation between 1999 and 2015); Michael Wood, The 
General Assembly and the International Law Commission: What Happens to the Commission’s Work and 
Why?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN 
HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 373, 376, 378–79 (Isabelle Buffard et al., eds., 2008) (noting two instances 
of the ILC producing draft articles and recommending that the UNGA use them as the basis for treaty 
negotiation between 1999 and 2008); see also Sean D. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, 
or Scholarly Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC’s Work Product, in THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE 29, 34–35 (Maurizio 
Ragazzi ed., 2013).  
4 Cogan, supra note 3, at 286; Murphy, supra note 3, at 33–34; Wood, supra note 3, at 377 (noting 
instances in which the Sixth Committee has not followed the Commission’s recommendations); see also 
Kristina Daugirdas, The International Law Commission Reinvents Itself?, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 
79, 79 (2014). 
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Law.5 In that timeframe, it concluded only one product intended for 
disposition as hard law, the Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disasters, which it recommended be considered for a convention.6 
Of the topics that make up the ILC’s pending work in progress, most are 
being pursued as soft law projects.7  
This essay explores the implications of the ILC’s transition toward a 
greater emphasis on soft law. It first argues that soft law is an effective 
vehicle for the ILC’s mission of codifying and progressively developing 
international law, and that, likewise, the ILC is well-structured to produce 
soft law. It then observes that the ILC’s soft law has in fact been influential 
on an audience of diverse global legal actors. Finally, it contends that the ILC 
can best serve its core purposes by recognizing this widespread soft law 
audience and taking steps to engage with it more robustly. 
II. THE ILC AND SOFT LAW 
While there is considerable debate about the exact nature of the 
distinction between hard law and soft law,8 for purposes of this article 
focusing on the work product of the ILC, what is most significant is the 
difference in the forms and in the approval processes for hard law and soft 
law outputs. In the ILC context, hard law constitutes treaties that are 
negotiated and ratified on the basis of draft articles produced by the ILC. In 
contrast, soft law may be issued in several formats, including draft articles 
not recommended for conversion to a treaty, principles, guidelines, and so 
on. There is no negotiation or ratification process for the ILC’s soft law, 
although there are multiple opportunities for state input and the ILC does 
typically request that the UNGA endorse its soft law work. Also important to 
 
5 Int’l Law Comm’n, Texts, Instruments, and Final Reports, U.N., 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/texts.shtml (last updated Aug. 30, 2018). 
6 Id. The draft articles and this recommendation are currently under consideration by the Sixth 
Committee.  
7 Its work on protection of the atmosphere and provisional application of treaties are being 
developed in the form of draft guidelines; its work on peremptory norms is being developed in the form 
of draft conclusions; and its work on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts is being 
developed as draft principles. Sean D. Murphy, Anniversary Commemoration and Work of the 
International Law Commission’s Seventieth Session, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 90, 96–104 (2019). The topics 
of succession of states in respect of state responsibility and immunity of state officials from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction are being developed into draft articles and so could be finalized either with or without 
recommendations for adoption as conventions. Id. at 104–06; Sean D. Murphy, Crimes Against Humanity 
and Other Topics: The Sixty-Ninth Session of the International Law Commission, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 970, 
981–88 (2017). One current initiative, the Draft Articles on Crimes against Humanity, has been expressly 
designated as being produced with an eye to adoption as a treaty. Id. at 970–71. 
8 See supra notes 1–2.  
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this analysis is the extent and nature of various global actors’ reliance on the 
ILC’s soft law, discussed in detail below. 
The functions of soft law overlap considerably with the ILC’s 
commitment to contribute to the codification and progressive development 
of international law.9 While soft law norms “do not impose legally binding 
obligations,” they “may . . . lay the ground, or constitute the building blocks, 
for the gradual formation of customary rules or treaty provisions.”10 
Furthermore, under some circumstances, soft law “may be regarded as 
declaratory, or indicative, of a customary rule, or instead as helping to 
crystallize such a rule.”11 Soft law may also help to shape state practice, or to 
direct decisionmakers’, scholars’, and advocates’ attention in such a way as 
to encourage constructive development of the law. In addition, “secondary 
soft law” interprets and applies existing hard law.12 Increasingly, actors in the 
global community have treated soft law norms as persuasive authority.13  
As such, apart from the aforementioned pragmatic considerations about 
the likelihood that the UNGA will proceed on and states will ratify a proposed 
convention, there are numerous substantive reasons that the ILC might deem 
a soft law format to be the most effective way for it to serve its function of 
codifying and progressively developing international law with regard to a 
particular topic at a particular time.14 I highlight here several factors that 
relate directly to the nature of soft law, and in particular, to the overlap of 
soft law’s role in enabling the evolution of international law with the core 
 
9 While article 15 of the ILC statute linked its progressive development function to hard law, in 
the form of creation of a draft convention, and its codification function to soft law, in the form of other 
types of outputs, that lockstep connection has lapsed with the partial collapse of the distinction between 
progressive development and codification itself. Wood characterizes the previous tendency to default to 
treaties as the mode of encapsulating the ILC’s work as “a hangover from the ‘codification movement’ . . 
. , a limited view of what ‘codification’ involved, and a particular view of the advantages of treaty law 
over customary international law.” Wood, supra note 3, at 383. The ILC determines what form its work 
will take on a case by case basis, without indicating whether it considers a particular project or particular 
provisions to be progressive development or codification. 
10 Cassese, supra note 1, at 196. 
11 Cassese contends that this analysis should be the same whether assessing a principle enshrined 
in soft law or a principle generally. Id. at 196–97. 
12 Shelton, supra note 1, at 70 (“Secondary soft law includes the recommendations and general 
comments of international supervisory organs, the jurisprudence of courts and commissions, decisions of 
special rapporteurs and other ad hoc bodies, and the resolutions of political organs of international 
organizations applying primary norms. Most of this secondary soft law is pronounced by institutions 
whose existence and jurisdiction is derived from a treaty and who apply norms contained in the same 
treaty.”). 
13 Wood, supra note 3, at 381 (noting the soft law functions served by the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts). 
14 Michael Wood suggests a series of relevant factors, including those listed here and others. Id. 
at 383–84. 
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functions of the ILC. In addition, as discussed at the end of this list, just as 
these can be understood as reasons that the ILC might elect a soft law format 
to encapsulate its norms, these considerations also suggest reasons that the 
ILC is particularly well-suited as an institution to produce soft law.15  
A. Advantages of Soft Law for the ILC’s Mission 
One factor is the maturity of the existing international law on the topic. 
In areas of law that are still evolving, adoption of a convention might be 
premature from the perspective of legal development, as it would not allow 
for continued modification of the norms through practice.16 Soft law also 
provides a more flexible environment for states to implement and adapt 
nascent norms on a case-by-case basis. In such instances, the ILC can use 
soft law to codify existing norms and promulgate others in the spirit of 
progressive development, without halting the development process or 
discouraging engagement by states.17 
Relatedly, principles, guidelines, and other such alternative formats also 
tend to make space for the ILC to address norms that are at different stages 
of stability and consensus.18 Several scholars have noted that the draft articles 
format may tend to suggest that all the articles are equally well-established 
as customary international law, even if there is a range of consensus on 
various articles; this is both because of the expectations created by the use of 
that format and because such articles are by their nature declaratory in tone.19 
In contrast, other formats allow for a broader range of expressed certainty in 
the tone of various provisions and may invite further analysis and adaptation. 
For example, the ILC’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties was 
 
15 There is an extensive literature concerning the reasons states might prefer soft law to hard law 
and the relevant theories of international law and international relations. See, e.g., Alan E. Boyle, Some 
Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 901 (1999); Guzman & 
Meyer, supra note 1; Klabbers, supra note 1; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 550–51; Shaffer & 
Dunoff, supra note 2, at 202–07. Here, I focus on incentives for the ILC as an institution that is committed 
to effective international legal development. 
16 Wood, supra note 3, at 383–84. 
17 In contrast, the currently pending Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, which are 
expected to be recommended for development into a treaty, represent a mature topic well-suited to a hard 
law format. There have now been several decades of prosecutions of this crime, which is accordingly well-
established and is also generally accepted. In addition, international criminal law scholars and advocates 
have long called for a treaty defining crimes against humanity, to put it on an equal footing with the other 
core international crimes of genocide and war crimes and to avoid fragmentation in the definition of this 
crime by the many international, hybrid, and national courts that hear such cases. See, e.g., FORGING A 
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011). 
18 Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 80. 
19 Id. at 79–80; Murphy, supra note 3, at 34–35. 
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characterized by the ILC as a “toolbox,” which suggests opportunities for 
states to pick and choose among its guidelines; the Guide also contains 
recommendations concerning best practices that are framed as suggestions 
rather than requirements.20 Thus, while draft articles do represent soft law if 
relied on in their own right rather than serving as the basis for a treaty, soft 
law also offers a range of alternative forms that may present expressive 
advantages.21 
A third reason is that the process of negotiating and ratifying a treaty 
may be detrimental to the quality or perceived legitimacy of the concerned 
norms. The ILC’s work and its end products are primarily shaped by an 
interest in the law as such, in its role as an expert body. Since the process of 
negotiating a treaty will inevitably be driven at least in part by national 
interests, changes introduced during those negotiations may not be 
improvements from a legal development perspective, but rather may reflect 
political compromises. In addition, if the treaty does not garner many 
ratifications, that public demonstration of a lack of support may undermine 
the perceived legitimacy of the concerned norms. Thus, if the quality or 
perceived legitimacy of the norms would be at risk during a treaty negotiation 
process, a soft law format that can stand on its own merits may be the better 
option.22  
In contrast, rather than serving as an alternative to a treaty, secondary 
soft law functions as a mechanism for elaborating on existing hard law. For 
example, the ILC’s recent soft law project producing Draft Conclusions on 
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties elaborates on its previous hard law project 
developing draft articles that became the Vienna Convention on Treaties.23 
 
20 Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 81. 
21 While I have framed this question as one of effective expression and degrees of stability or 
consensus, this consideration has also been framed as one of distinguishing between codification and 
progressive development. The ILC does not typically specify which provisions it deems to be progressive 
development and which it deems codification, although it has done so at times in its commentaries. 
Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 79–80; Murphy, supra note 3, at 34–35. This distinction is often unclear in 
practice, and there are pros and cons to such signaling. In my view, this consideration is not about 
categorizing provisions as codification or progressive development, nor about determining their relative 
authority, but rather about accurately conveying the current stability and scope of norms and appropriately 
encouraging further adaptation and development of those norms.  
22 This concern has been repeatedly raised by states when considering whether to open 
negotiations to develop draft articles into a convention. Wood, supra note 3, at 381 (discussing the reasons 
for the United Kingdom’s resistance to negotiating a convention); U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/71/79, at 2, 4, 7–8 (April 21, 2016) (comments 
of Australia, Finland, and the United Kingdom). 
23 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent 
Practices in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018); Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft 
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Several other ongoing ILC soft law projects also interpret this convention.24 
In this context, using a soft law format avoids any risk of perceived conflict 
with the binding terms of the treaty.  
A final factor is that the implementation of international law norms often 
depends on an internalization of those norms into state bureaucracies and 
private institutions, and on the decisions of the many actors that carry out 
those norms to align policies and practices with them. While this may occur 
top-down after ratification of a treaty, it may also develop bottom-up, as on-
the-ground actors identify soft law norms as useful in guiding their work and 
ascertain how best to adapt and implement them in their contexts. Thus, soft 
law allows for decisions about whether and how implementation should be 
carried out to be made by the expert practitioners who do the concerned work, 
rather than by political actors who are focused on political aims and are not 
necessarily experts in the work at hand. It also allows for the eventual 
evolution of the norms based on that bottom-up practice.25 
These considerations reflect several interconnected realities that make 
soft law a valuable mechanism for the ILC’s purposes of codification and 
progressive development of international law, and in many instances a more 
appropriate format than a treaty. First, when international law norms develop 
in an evolutionary fashion, they do so in contexts that may be predominantly 
legal, bureaucratic, or action-oriented, rather than in predominantly political 
contexts, and this may be to their benefit. Second, hard law products titrate 
norms through the political processes of negotiation and ratification; soft law 
products allow for the possibility of testing the norms in use before, or instead 
of, subjecting them to evaluation by political elites. As such, both political 
considerations and legal development considerations suggest that 
recommendation of a treaty should only occur at the right moment, when 
further evolution is not desired, when fragmentation is feared, and when 
 
Articles on the Law of Treaties (1966); see also Shelton, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing secondary soft 
law). 
24 See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, 
annex at 274–82 (2014); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/10, annex III, at 199–201 (2011). 
25 See generally EMANUEL ADLER, COMMUNITARIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE 
EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13–26 (2005); Elena Baylis, Reassessing the 
Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (2009); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International 
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International 
Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 128–29 (2005). This 
is not to say, of course, that there will be no political considerations at play in the determination of whether 
and how to implement those norms on the ground, but rather, that those decisions may be made in a 
bureaucratic or action-oriented context, rather than in a political context. 
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political interests favor the concerned norms.26 When this is not the case, 
seeking a treaty would be unwise, and a soft law structure will better 
contribute to the development of international law. Finally, as discussed 
further below, the advantages that hard law has over customary law or 
developing legal norms are diminished by the act of crystallizing soft law in 
a singular, written form. Then, the distinction becomes a matter of authority 
and durability, rather than clarity or accessibility. 
B. Institutional Advantages of the ILC for Producing Soft Law 
Just as soft law is often an effective mechanism for the ILC’s aims, so 
the ILC is also particularly well-suited as an institution to produce soft law. 
Its structure, work processes, and expertise amplify the benefits of soft law 
and offset its weaknesses. Hard law gains its authority through explicit state 
agreement; soft law must gain adherents through its utility, credibility, and 
persuasive value.  
The ILC has the resources and established work processes to enable it 
to research and consolidate widely dispersed examples of state practice, court 
decisions, and other evidence of customary law or developing legal norms, 
to draft those norms in concise and precise terms, and to produce nuanced 
commentaries explaining and documenting its findings and conclusions. 
Further, a defining feature of the ILC’s work process is its direct and robust 
engagement with states, which have the opportunity not only to provide 
information to the ILC, but also to discuss its drafts in the Sixth Committee 
and to provide written comments; this debate and commentary is considered 
and incorporated by the concerned Special Rapporteur and Drafting 
Committee in developing a final draft of the eventual product. Thus, while 
the ILC’s soft law products do not have the explicit agreement of states, they 
do possess the imprimatur of states’ consideration, analysis, and input.  
In addition to its work processes, the ILC’s known expertise and 
longstanding reputation lend credibility to its work product. In considering 
the ILC’s role, Watts noted that “[o]n particular topics the authority which 
underlies [the ILC’s] work . . . has been influential in consolidating the law: 
and more generally, its intellectual approach to establishing coherent bodies 
of rules in different areas has given an overall solidarity to international law 
which was previously lacking.”27 Finally, the ILC’s regular reporting on its 
work in its yearbooks and public engagement with the Sixth Committee 
 
26 Wood, supra note 3, at 381 (“[I]t is difficult to see what would be gained by the adoption of a 
convention. The [Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts] were already 
proving their worth and were entering the fabric of international law through State practice, decisions of 
courts and tribunals and the writings of publicists.”). 
27 Id. at 383. 
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provides a degree of transparency, which is further amplified by the analysis 
in its commentaries. 
In particular, through its deployment of these resources, expertise and 
transparency, the ILC’s soft law outputs render customary and developing 
norms distinct and readily accessible to potential users, as distinct and as 
accessible as hard law. In general, “[t]reaties are often clearer and more stable 
than the rules of customary law, or at least thought to be so.”28 However, in 
instances in which the ILC has consolidated customary law or emerging legal 
norms in a singular, written form, this soft law product is likely to be just as 
exact and certain as a treaty. In this way, the ILC’s soft law texts are distinct 
from customary law and other norms that have not been so codified. 
Accordingly, courts, bureaucrats, NGOs, and others considering matters to 
which the concerned norms are relevant may find the ILC’s articulation of 
those norms renders those norms more immediately useful.  
The ILC’s involvement also facilitates a dynamic relationship between 
hard law and soft law over time. Because it has the ability to return to 
different aspects of topics at different moments, its soft law norms can more 
readily be developed into new hard law, or alternatively, it can deploy new 
soft law to elaborate on prior hard law.29 As such, it can consider its global 
audience’s response to its work and then respond by leveraging whichever 
form will most effectively promote its mission of developing international 
law. In addition, its robust engagement with states and the UNGA’s 
endorsement of its soft law ameliorate somewhat the distinction between hard 
law to which states have directly acceded and soft law to which they have 
not, by offering its audience the assurance that states have at least thoroughly 
considered and weighed in on the concerned soft law norms. Thus, rather 
than forming sharply contrasting alternatives with distinctly differing results, 
the ILC’s hard law and soft law can be seen as intersecting, interactive, and 
interrelated. 30  
 
28  Wood, supra note 3, at 384. Another distinction between treaties and customary law that is not 
addressed by the ILC’s work is their status in domestic law, which is significant before national courts. 
Id. 
29  For example, the ILC issued the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts as soft law without recommending they be adopted as a convention. Since then, the UNGA 
has repeatedly sought reports on tribunals’ use of the draft articles and state comments on their view of 
the articles, with an eye to their potential future negotiation as a convention. G.A. Res. 71/133 (Dec. 13, 
2016); G.A. Res. 68/204 (Dec. 16, 2013); G.A. Res. 65/19 (Dec. 6, 2010); G.A. Res. 62/61 (Dec. 6, 2007); 
G.A. Res. 59/35 (Dec. 2, 2004). In addition, as discussed above, the ILC is currently considering several 
topics relating to the Vienna Convention on Treaties.  
30 Compare Klabbers, supra note 1 (sharply distinguishing hard law and soft law), with Shelton, 
supra note 1, at 68 (“The distinction [between hard law and soft law] may not be as significant as expected 
. . . .”). 
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III. THE ILC’S SOFT LAW INFLUENCE AND AUDIENCE 
A. Influence 
If the ILC’s shift toward soft law is indeed increasing its relevance in its 
core role of codifying and progressively developing international law, we 
would expect to see signs that its soft law offerings are in fact influencing 
legal actors. This influence might be seen in a variety of contexts, such as in 
citations from decision-makers like courts, arbitration panels, and treaty 
bodies; in scholars’ analysis; in the policies and practices of governmental 
and intergovernmental organizations; in the advocacy carried out by NGOs; 
in informal circulation through network and community connections; and of 
course, in formal circulation by the UNGA through resolutions of support or 
other actions. By their nature, some of these uses are more readily observed 
than others. In particular, citations in published decisions and scholarship are 
publicly available, whereas institutional practice and informal circulation are 
impossible to access except through interviews or participant observation 
within the concerned organizations.  
Several empirical studies suggest that the ILC’s soft law is widely 
publicly cited. Danae Azaria’s study of the International Court of Justice’s 
citation of ILC documents and commentaries has found extensive ICJ 
reliance on the ILC’s work.31 Similarly, a study of investment tribunal awards 
in 2009 found that ILC rules, including soft law, were treated as evidence of 
customary law by such tribunals.32 In addition, at the request of the UNGA, 
the UN Secretary-General has produced a report on citations to the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (which 
the ILC did not recommend be developed into a convention and so are cited 
in their own right as soft law). The most recent version of this report lists 159 
citations to the Draft Articles by a variety of courts, tribunals, and 
commissions, including by: 
the International Court of Justice; the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea; the WTO Appellate Body; 
international arbitral tribunals; the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights; the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; the European Court of Human Rights; the 
 
31 Danae Azaria, The Working Methods of the International Law Commission: Adherence to 
Methodology, Commentaries and Decision-Making, in 70 YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION—DRAWING A BALANCE FOR THE FUTURE, at 4–5 (forthcoming 2019) (draft on file with 
author) (finding that the ICJ has relied on ILC sources in 22 cases to address 39 legal questions). 
32 Moshe Hirsch, Sources of International Investment Law 12 (July 21, 2011) (unpublished 
research paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1892564 (citing awards that themselves cite ILC soft law). 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights; and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon.33 
Furthermore, even a selective search of publicly available documents 
unearths many examples of use of ILC soft law by courts, treaty bodies, 
states, scholars, and others. Concerning the above-mentioned Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, James 
Crawford has observed that: 
States as well as non-State litigants are increasingly relying 
on the articles and commentaries, and international courts 
and tribunals are treating them as a source on questions of 
State responsibility.34  
In addition to the courts and tribunals listed above, the Draft Articles have 
also been cited by the World Bank,35 parties before the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee,36 the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,37 and various scholars,38 among others.39 
 
33 U.N. Secretary General, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Compilation 
of Decisions of International Courts, Tribunals and Other Bodies, U.N. Doc A/71/80, at 5 (2016).  
34 James R Crawford, State Responsibility, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1093 (last updated 
September 2006).  
35 SIOBHÁN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DIMENSIONS 24 (2011). 
36 Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Comm. Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional 
Protocol to the Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Concerning Communication No. 2022/2011, 
CCPR/C/113/D/2022/2011, annex at 5 n.7 (Aug. 20, 2015). 
37 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Views Adopted by the Comm. at Its Sixty-Second 
Session, Concerning Commc’n No. 14/2016, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/62/D/14/2016, at 13 n. 12, (Dec. 19, 2017) 
[hereinafter Views Concerning Commc’n No. 14/2016]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, 
Views Adopted by the Comm. under the Optional Protocol to the Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. and 
Cultural Rights, Concerning Commc’n No. 4/2014, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/59/D/4/2014 (Nov. 24, 2016) 
[hereinafter Views Concerning Commc’n No. 4/2014]. 
38 Benoit Mayer, Obligations of Conduct in the International Law on Climate Change: A Defence, 
REV. EUR., COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10 n.87) (available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3156067); Jesse L. Reynolds, An Economic Analysis of Liability and 
Compensation for Harm from Large-Scale Solar Climate Engineering Field Research in Solar Climate 
Engineering, 5 CLIMATE L. 182, 199 n.33 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2630934; Charles-Emmanuel 
Côté, From Sea to Sea: Regulatory Space of Federal and Provincial Governments in Canada Under CETA 
and TPP Investment Chapters 14 n.94 (July 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857148). 
39 See also Donald K. Anton, The Principle of Residual Liability in the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: The Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability 
for International Seabed Mining (ITLOS Case No. 17), 7 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, 
241, 251 n.45 (citing The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1, 
1999, ITLOS Rep. 1999, 10, ¶¶ 169–71 (applying “article 42, paragraph 1, of the Draft Articles of the 
International Law Commission on State Responsibility . . . .”); Crawford, supra note 34 (noting citations 
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Other soft law products are also influential. The Draft Principles on the 
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of 
Hazardous Activities have been cited by International Court of Justice parties 
and judges40 and by entities participating in a case before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,41 and have been discussed by environmental 
law scholars.42 The Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law have been cited by states parties before 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,43 by 
states parties before the European Court of Human Rights, by the Eureopean 
Court of Human Rights itself,44 and by others.45 Other soft law documents 
issued by the ILC have also been extensively cited and discussed.46 
 
by ICSID and other investment tribunals, WTO arbitral panels, and other courts and tribunals previously 
mentioned). 
40 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 
I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶ 190 (Dec. 16); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa 
Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), 
2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, 3 nn.10 & 13, 5 n.23, 6 nn.28–30 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by Bhandari, J.), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/150/18860.pdf. 
41 Anton, supra note 39, at 17–18 (citing submissions by the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Stichting Greenpeace Council). 
42 PHILLIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 710 (2012); 
Reynolds, supra note 38, at 202, 207; Caroline E. Foster, The ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of 
Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities: Privatizing Risk, 14 REV. 
EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 265 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1336329; Gou Haibo, ILC Proposal 
on the Rule of the Origin State in Transboundary Damage, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 108 (Michael G. 
Faure & Song Ying, eds., 2008). 
43 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Dec. 12/2007, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/44/D/12/2007, ¶¶ 9.3 n.6 & 10.2 (Aug. 4, 2009). 
44 Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 87; Nat’l Union of Rail, Mar. & Transp. 
Workers v. United Kingdom, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 2 (Wojtyczek, J., concurring); X & Others v. Austria, 
2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 22 (Casadevall, J., Ziemele, J., Kovler, J., Jočienė, J., Šikuta, J., De Gaetano, J. & 
Sicilianos, J., jointly dissenting in part); Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 17, (Ziemele, J., 
dissenting in part). 
45  JORUN BAUMGARTNER, TREATY SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 90 (2016); 
JENNIFER E. FARRELL, THE INTERFACE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND TAXATION 213 (2013); 
MCINERNEY-LANKFORD ET AL., supra note 35, at 24; Gearóid Ó Cuinn & Stephanie Switzer, Ebola and 
the Airplane – Securing Mobility Through Regime Interactions and Legal Adaptation, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 71, 73 n.25, 76 n.52 (2019); Kal Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal 
Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 
THE STATE OF THE ART 293, 311–12 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds., 2012). 
46 For example, the Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of 
Creating Legal Obligations have been cited in a variety of cases, scholarly writings, and policy documents. 
E.g., Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 153, ¶ 
141 (October 1); BENITO MÜLLER ET AL., EUROPEAN CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVE, UNILATERAL 
DECLARATIONS: THE MISSING LEGAL LINK IN THE BALI ACTION PLAN 24 (2010), 
https://eurocapacity.org/downloads/Unilateral_Declarations_English_May_2010.pdf; Mayer, supra note 
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B. Audience 
One inevitable implication of this widespread reliance is that the 
audience for soft law is not solely states, but also other global legal and policy 
actors.47 In assessing the purpose of the ILC’s shift toward soft law, Jacob 
Cogan concluded that the ILC was envisioning for itself an audience beyond 
the member states of the UNGA, including the many different types of actors 
that constitute the international community and that make decisions or take 
actions relevant to the concerned legal standards.48 This brief survey of 
citations of the ILC’s work lends credence to the claim that, whether the ILC 
intended this result or not, it has in fact reached global legal actors that 
include, but are not limited to, the political representatives of states in the 
Sixth Committee. Significantly, while the ILC reports its soft law products 
to the Sixth Committee and seeks its support for them, those soft law norms 
do not require the approval of states to take effect in the way that hard law 
norms do; rather, their legitimation and impact depend on their use by this 
extended global legal community.  
This conclusion also comports with theoretical and empirical models of 
international law-making processes, which emphasize the significance of an 
enormous variety of legal actors playing diverse roles in developing and 
implementing international legal norms. Across various areas of international 
law, scholars have argued that legal development does not necessarily 
proceed top-down, from the international to the domestic, but rather, occurs 
through iterative engagement among numerous actors at numerous levels; 
likewise, legal development is not wholly state-centered, but may be driven 
by interactions among peers in varied governmental, intergovernmental, non-
governmental, and private settings.49 By way of example, theories and studies 
 
38, at 9 n.86; Suyash Paliwal, The Binding Force of G-20 Commitments, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 
7 n.30 (2014), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2016/09/paliwal-
the-binding-force-of-g-20-commitments-2h1zooz.pdf. 
47  The findings discussed above are under-representative. The searches were not intended to be 
comprehensive, and in addition, they include only those users who can be readily identified through 
searches in online databases, thereby artificially excluding a variety of potential users including 
government lawyers, bureaucrats, and NGOs. 
48 Cogan, supra note 3, at 9.  
49 E.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 864–65 (2006); William 
W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 
24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2002); Levit, supra note 25; Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, 
and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 773 (2006); 
Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks? Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 409, 433–34 (2008); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” Schools: Assessing the 
Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 455–56 
(2007). See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
 
03 - BAYLIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/26/19  12:54 PM 
1020 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:1007 
of transnational networks and communities affirm their significance to legal 
development through information-sharing, collaboration, and creation of 
shared practices.50 A study based in organizational theory highlights the roles 
played by expert practitioners and institutional structures in enforcing 
international legal norms.51 Transnational legal process theory emphasizes 
the importance of internalization of norms into bureaucratic and domestic 
systems.52 Global legal pluralism highlights the legitimacy of processes and 
practices developed at all levels of law, whether formal or informal, and by 
all kinds of actors, whether official or unofficial, in contributing to the 
formation of legal standards.53  
It is important to emphasize, however, that this global legal acceptance 
and implementation, while not dependent on prior formal ratification by 
states, is nonetheless closely connected with state engagement and 
acceptance. The ILC’s choice of topics is often at the behest of states; it 
regularly reports to and receives feedback from states in the the Sixth 
Committee; it diligently researches the practice of states; and it consistently 
seeks the support of the UNGA for its soft law outputs. It is impossible to 
imagine that a set of norms promulgated by the ILC that met with widespread 
state rejection would nonetheless be accepted and implemented by other legal 
actors. Thus, it is not that other actors are displacing states as the ILC’s soft 
law audience, but rather, that other actors are joining states as that audience.54  
 
50 Adler, supra note 25; Elena Baylis, Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice Networks 
and Communities, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 625, 625 (2014) [hereinafter Baylis, Function and 
Dysfunction]. See generally Elena Baylis, What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of Post-
Conflict Justice Initiatives, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 243 (2015); Kal Raustiala, The 
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International 
Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World 
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 (2004); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and 
International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007). 
51 Laura Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International 
Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2007). 
52 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–05 (1996). 
53 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2007). 
54 In considering whether to put forward the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts for development as a treaty, the UNGA has asked not only for state input 
but also for reports on courts and tribunals’ use of the articles, suggesting that it recognizes the significance 
of this broader audience in legitimizing the concerned norms. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Compilation of Decisions of International Courts, Tribunals and 
Other Bodies, U.N. Doc A/71/80, at 5 (2016). Further, as noted above, states are not unitary actors, and 
soft law presents an opportunity for various actors within a state to engage with, assist in the development 
or modification of, and implement norms, rather than having political representatives of states at the 
UNGA be the sole gatekeepers for such norms. Id.  
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IV. INFLUENCING A GLOBAL LEGAL AUDIENCE 
A. Key Factors 
Several key characteristics have facilitated the ILC’s influence on this 
global legal audience. As noted in the first section of this essay, the ILC’s 
soft law documents enable legal actors to use customary and emerging legal 
norms without undertaking the arduous process of researching and analyzing 
different legal standards and practices; the ILC has done that work for them 
and has issued clear statements of the current state of the law. In addition, the 
ILC’s work is widely accessible, as its final texts can be freely downloaded 
from its website. The ILC also has a strong reputation as an expert body. Its 
work processes, and in particular its careful consideration of numerous 
sources and its engagement with states, are transparent in its reporting and 
commentaries.55 The ILC itself has noted its mandate, its thorough research 
process, and its active engagement with states and the UNGA as foundations 
for its authority.56 The significance of these characteristics of utility, 
accessibility, expertise, comprehensive research and analysis, and reputation, 
to an institution’s influence are confirmed by studies of persuasive authority 
in international and domestic courts. In brief, where those factors (among 
others) are present, courts are more likely to accept and deploy legal norms 
that they are not otherwise obligated to apply.57  
While the reasons that a decisionmaker, litigant, or scholar has chosen 
to cite a particular authority are rarely made explicit, there are hints that some 
of these characteristics have played a role in citations to the ILC’s work. 
Certainly, the most fundamental reason that legal actors are relying on the 
ILC’s soft law is that it is useful; these norms enable parties to a case to lend 
support to their argument, assist a decision-maker in grappling with a 
 
55 See generally Azaria, supra note 31. 
56 In considering the weight that its work product should be given by decisionmakers, the ILC has 
identified its sources, its stage of work, and states’ responses as determining factors in assessing the 
authority of particular documents. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 22 (2018).  
57 There have been several studies of the persuasive influence of certain international courts over 
domestic courts; the relationship between these international and domestic courts is analogous to the 
position of the ILC vis-à-vis global legal actors, because the studied international courts develop legal 
norms but do not have authority over the concerned domestic courts to require them to adopt those norms. 
Elena Baylis, The Persuasive Authority of Internationalized Criminal Tribunals, 32 AM. U. INT’L L.R. 
611, 625–26, 631–32 (2017) [hereinafter Baylis, Persuasive Authority]; Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. 
Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and Its Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patters 
in the Andean Community, 41 J. INT’L L. & POL. 871, 875–76 (2009); Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 300–06, 321–
22 (1997).  
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contested legal issue, and provide fodder for scholarly analysis. In addition 
to the implicit value placed on the ILC’s expertise and systematic research 
and analysis when legal actors cite to ILC sources as evidence of customary 
law or legal norms, some citations to ILC soft law explicitly rely on the expert 
discussion in the commentaries.58 There are also indications that the ILC’s 
soft law audience accepts the varying degrees of authority that the proffered 
norms possess and finds it useful to receive the ILC’s statements even of 
norms that do not necessarily rise to the level of customary law; some 
citations treat the concerned principles or draft articles as authoritative 
declarations of states’ obligations, while others analyze their customary 
nature or persuasive value.59 
Finally, concerning accessibility, one mechanism by which legal norms 
are circulated and put into use is through interconnections within 
transnational networks and communities.60 These are difficult to trace 
through research into written documents, but even in the written resources, 
there are hints of such connections. Two of the attorneys representing 
Nicaragua in an ICJ case in which Nicaragua cited the ILC’s Draft Articles 
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities were 
former ILC chairs, for example.61  
B. Extending the ILC’s Influence 
In each of these areas, the ILC has processes in place that have served 
to promote its work and extend its influence, as described above. But because 
the ILC is an expert body of the Sixth Committee, its existing procedures 
primarily orient it toward that Committee, toward the UNGA, and toward the 
political representatives of states in those bodies as its primary audience.  
 
58 E.g., Views Concerning Commc’n No. 4/2014, supra note 37, at ¶ 6.7; Views Concerning 
Commc’n No. 14/2016, supra note 37, at 13 n.12. 
59 E.g., Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 
I.C.J. 665, at n.28–30 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by Bhandari, J.); Anton, supra note 39, at 17–19. While 
the ILC has not generally held itself out as an authority in its work product, it has done so in its 
commentaries. For example, the text of the Draft Conclusions on Customary International Law itself does 
not explicitly list the ILC as a source of evidence of customary law, but in the commentaries, the 
Commission averred that “[t]he output of the International Law Commission itself merits special 
consideration in the present context.” Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 58, at 22. Similarly, in an interim 
report on the ILC’s progress on the topic of jus cogens, the chairperson stated that the Committee had 
determined not to identify its work as evidence of a jus cogens norm in the draft conclusions, but instead, 
to mention its role in the commentaries. Chairperson of the Drafting Committee of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), at 4 (2018).  
60 Baylis, Function and Dysfunction, supra note 50, at 643. 
61  Costa Rica v. Nicar. and Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. at 672. 
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While the Sixth Committee and the UNGA will always remain a 
primary audience for the ILC, they are not its only audience. In particular, a 
political process of approval by the Sixth Committee or the UNGA is not the 
determinative factor for the fate of the ILC’s soft law work; rather, that 
depends on its diverse global audience, which includes but is not limited to 
states. In addition, while state practice and interests are key aspects of the 
information that the ILC needs to conduct its work, the practice and interests 
of other global legal actors also contribute to the development of legal norms 
and so are also important to the ILC’s analysis.  
Accordingly, just as communicating and engaging with the Sixth 
Committee has been and will continue to be critical to the ILC’s work, so 
also, the ILC should proactively consult and connect to a greater extent with 
its broader soft law audience. This could include more robust and systematic 
engagement with tribunals, treaty bodies, courts, other UN entities, 
international law organizations, NGOs, advocacy organizations, bureaucrats, 
subject matter experts, and representatives of other concerned 
organizations.62 Such engagement is contemplated by the Statute of the 
International Law Commission, which authorizes the ILC to “consult with 
any international or national organizations, official or non-official, on any 
subject entrusted to it if it believes that such a procedure might aid it in the 
performance of its functions”63 and to “consult with scientific institutions and 
individual experts.”64 It would also build upon the existing practice of the 
ILC, which has undertaken such consultations from time to time.65  
The first and most important step is to recognize this global audience 
and consider how the ILC’s processes might be adapted to better engage with 
it, including in gathering information, designing outputs, and publicizing its 
work. I offer some preliminary thoughts and examples below, but the ILC 
itself is in the best position to assess how it could benefit from this broader 
engagement and how its existing processes might most appropriately be 
adapted.  
 
62 The ILC does regularly meet with certain tribunals and codifying institutions, including “the 
President of the International Court of Justice, the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International 
Law of the Council of Europe, [and] the African Union Commission on International Law,” among others. 
More rarely, it consults with other entities, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, chapter II, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017). 
63 Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 26(1) (1947). In addition, consultation with 
states, the UNGA, and other concerned UN organs is a mandatory part of the ILC’s procedures under the 
Statute. See id. at arts. 16–24. 
64 Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 16(e) (1947).  
65 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, chapter II, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/72/10 (2017). 
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First, I would suggest that the ILC could consult systematically with a 
variety of legal actors both in the process of selecting each topic and in 
considering the existing legal practice and substantive norms for each 
subject. Presently, this does not appear to be a regularized part of the ILC’s 
work, although it does carry out such discussions upon occasion.66 There 
would be several benefits to such a process. The ILC would gain the 
knowledge and practical expertise of the actors working in these areas.67 In 
addition, participation in the development process is likely to encourage 
those legal actors to make use of the eventual output. At a minimum, they 
will be aware of the ILC’s work on the subject. Legal actors who are involved 
in the development of a norm are typically more likely to disseminate and 
share that norm with others through informal networks and community 
associations.68  
The ILC could also proactively publicize its work to a variety of legal 
communities, institutions, and actors, in addition to making its work freely 
available on its website. Just what kind of measures must be taken and how 
extensive they must be to effectively reach a legal actor depends on the 
context, and in particular on the resources of the intended audience. For some 
audiences, translation into additional languages might make the ILC’s work 
more accessible; for audiences with limited internet access or research 
capacity, affirmatively circulating key documents might facilitate 
consideration and use.69 The ILC could also raise the profile of new soft law 
 
66 Int’l Law Comm’n, About the Commission: Relationships with Other Bodies, U.N. (January 11, 
2019), http://legal.un.org/ilc/activs.shtml. In addition, reports from the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
indicate meetings concerning the ILC’s work on treaty reservations and interpretation of treaties. Rep. of 
the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. A/73/40, at 9 (2018); Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
A/66/40, vol. I, at 3 (2011). A 2010 study found that the ILC has consulted with NGOs only sporadically. 
Steve Charnovitz, New Opportunities for Nongovernmental Actors in the International Law Commission 
(2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the George Washington Univ. Law Sch.), 
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1443&context=faculty_publications. The 
ILC’s mandatory processes focus on states; the ILC’s criteria for topic selection focus on ascertaining 
state needs and state practice, not the interests and practice of other legal actors. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. 
on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, ch. III, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018). 
67 It would also gain from diversifying its sources of input beyond what is possible from the 
Commission members themselves. While the ILC has considerable geographic diversity in its 
membership, its gender diversity remains limited, for example. Also, Charnovitz notes the benefits of 
getting input from NGO actors to complement the typical governmental and intergovernmental experience 
at the ILC. Charnovitz, supra note 66.  
68  Baylis, Function and Dysfunction, supra note 50, at 680; Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 82. 
However, this is dependent on those consultations going well and being perceived by the participants to 
be constructive; past consultations have apparently not always proceeded smoothly, so the separate 
question of how to make those consultations functional from the perspective of all participants is also 
important. Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 4. 
69 Baylis, Persuasive Authority, supra note 57, at 626.  
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documents with scholarly and practitioner communities by holding public or 
online events when its work product is finalized.70  
V. CONCLUSION 
The previous consensus of scholars who observed the ILC’s transition 
to a greater emphasis on soft law was that this change would expand the 
ILC’s audience and influence. This expectation has been borne out by the 
widespread use of the ILC’s soft law by courts, treaty bodies, and scholars, 
as well as by states in their capacity as legal actors. Of course, the ILC has 
continued to produce valuable hard law, such as its highly anticipated 
forthcoming Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, which are intended 
to be developed into a convention. But by producing soft law as well as hard 
law, the ILC is making effective use of its particular strengths and expertise. 
The ILC’s involvement increases the clarity and accessibility of international 
law norms and promotes a dynamic, synergistic relationship between hard 
law and soft law that contributes to the effective development of international 
law.  
In order to build on its existing soft law influence, the ILC should 
acknowledge its vast global audience and tailor its processes and practices to 
better reach this community. The global legal actors that constitute this 
audience could contribute to the ILC’s norm development process by 
conveying their own experience and expertise. Likewise, the ILC will 
enhance its credibility and gain new proponents by taking account of a 
broader range of perspectives in its processes. The ILC could also develop 
mechanisms to circulate its work to a variety of legal actors.  
By its nature, soft law is intended to spark the development of 
international law through iterative processes of practice and norm 
consolidation. By leveraging this format, the ILC better serves its aims of 
codifying and progressively developing international law. 
 
 
70 Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 5. 
